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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Drafted by A. Akalovsky

November 8, 1962

6 to 9:30 pm

Soviet Mission, New York

SUBJECT: CUBA

PARTICIPANTS: US - Ambassador Stevenson *Eys only* USSR - Mr. Kuznetsov
 - Mr. McCloy
 - A. Akalovsky

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Reviewed by: *Ernest K. Jr.*

2/12/92

Ambassador Stevenson said he had asked for this meeting because there were a number of points which could be discussed usefully until we heard from Mr. Mikoyan. One point which disturbed us after Mr. Kuznetsov's conversation with Mr. McCloy yesterday was that Mr. Kuznetsov had expressed misgivings about the inclusion of bombers in weapons to be removed. Mr. Kuznetsov had apparently expressed surprise, but bombers had been included in the category of offensive weapons from the very start, and we wanted to be sure that bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons would be removed along with missiles. Bombers caused us as much concern as missiles.

Mr. McCloy observed that Mr. Kuznetsov had told him he had taken up this matter with ^{his} the government but had not yet received any reply. He also noted that Mr. Kuznetsov had been notified of our concern with respect to IL-28 aircraft in Ambassador Stevenson's communication to him. The President's October 22 speech had likewise referred to bombers.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that Mr. McCloy had raised this matter with him

yesterday

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED by *W. H. H. Jr.* DATE *3/5/88*

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Yesterday and that he had given Mr. McCloy his preliminary comments. He said that now he was in a position to express ^{the} Soviet thinking on this matter. Drawing frequently on a prepared text, Mr. Kuznetsov then made the following remarks. The Soviet side was displeased with Ambassador Stevenson's letter concerning IL-28 aircraft and other matters. As to IL-28 aircraft, the Soviet Union was surprised that this matter had been raised, because it wondered since when aircraft such as mentioned in Ambassador Stevenson's letter were offensive; such aircraft were basically obsolete in view of their low ceiling and low speed. Thus, the US demand in this respect ^Could be regarded only as an attempt to protract the solution of the problem and to continue the differences and the tense relations between the US and the USSR. Furthermore, it was no secret ^{the} that aircraft referred to in Ambassador Stevenson's letter belonged to the category of coastal defence armaments and could not be used in combat over ~~the~~ in enemy territory, because they lacked the necessary ceiling and speed. Indeed, it would be foolish to send such aircraft into combat over enemy territory; these aircraft could be used only as coastal defence and ^{support by} even then they are required anti-aircraft artillery. He said he wished to stress that no military expert could classify these aircraft as offensive armaments under the conditions of modern warfare. Mr. Kuznetsov recalled that he had told Mr. McCloy yesterday, and he wished to repeat this again today, that the USSR was conducting these negotiations honestly and sincerely; wished to conclude the agreement as soon as possible and thus normalize the ^{the} situation and contribute to peace in the Caribbean area and throughout the world. If the US was also honest in pledging that it would not invade Cuba, then ~~the~~ it should not be disturbed by the existence of IL-28 aircraft

Cuban
in *Cuba* hands. The Soviet Union was able to understand the US concern about certain types of missiles, because missiles were really an instantaneous and invulnerable weapon; on the other hand, those aircraft were not offensive, but were merely defensive and subsidiary armaments. ^{bringing up} The ~~bringing up~~ by the US of this matter raised some questions in the USSR's mind because the negotiations were now in a stage where agreement was emerging on many points. Therefore, it was not useful to bring up additional points. Mr. Kuznetsov observed that as to reconnaissance or intelligence conducted by many countries, experience had shown that it did not always reflect the factual situation. He said he wished to stress that all this pointed to the need for discussing the main question, i.e., to seek agreement on the points which were still outstanding and to fulfill specifically the obligations undertaken by the two sides. The whole problem should be resolved in its entirety, and the USSR believes that this was possible, unless of course the other side advanced additional obstacles. The USSR believed ^{was} there ~~was~~ every possibility ~~immediacy~~ of reaching agreement and it was prepared to do everything to achieve this objective.

Ambassador Stevenson said that the US was also prepared to reach agreement as soon as possible. The US did not question the good faith of the USSR, and we expected that the USSR would not question ours. As to bombers and the argument whether ~~them~~ they were offensive or defensive, we had made our view clear from the very outset. The President, in his October 22 address to the nation, had said that "In addition, jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being untrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared."

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Furthermore, in his October 23 proclamation on the institution of quarantine, the President had also referred to bomber aircraft. In his lengthy message to the President of October 26, Mr. Khrushchev had said that "the Soviet Government, ... has given a new order to dismantle the weapons which are described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." But now we were suddenly told that we were obstructing negotiations by referring to these aircraft. Mr. Stevenson recalled that at the beginning Mr. Khrushchev had said that some of the weapons sent to Cuba were offensive, but then the problem had been resolved by the USSR's agreeing to remove what we regarded to be offensive weapons.

Mr. McCloy expressed surprise at the Soviet reaction, because ~~in his~~ ^{also} ~~supplementing~~ the President in his statements had referred to offensive weapons other than missiles. Also, in the conversation with Mr. Mikoyan, he, Mr. McCloy, had observed that if the period Mr. Mikoyan had indicated for the completion of the removal operation would not be sufficient because the crating of the equipment, and particularly aircraft, would take a long time, and no one raised any question about aircraft at that time. As to Mr. Kuznetsov's remarks about the obsolescence of these aircraft, Mr. McCloy said he could not see how jet bombers could be classified as obsolete comments; such bombers, armed with nuclear warheads, could be used for a sneak attack and in the hands of a man like Castro they created a very serious situation. Mr. McCloy also pointed out that during our presentation at the UN of UN reconnaissance photographs we had referred to both missiles and airfields with jet bombers, and thus Mr. Kuznetsov could not charge us with

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with raising new problems.

Mr. Kennedey regretted that the USSR approached this problem differently and that the US and the USSR had differences over it. He said that there were two aspects to the problem as raised by Mr. Stevenson and Mr. McCloy: a) a strictly legal, or formal aspect, i.e., whether there had been references to such weapons in certain documents; and b) the substantive aspect of the problem. As to the first aspect, the US asserted that if bombards were included, but references to the President's statements did not justify the claim that there was definite references to such aircraft in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, which constituted the basis for agreement. It was true that the President's proclamation and Ambassador Stevenson's letter of November 2 contained references to such aircraft, but the USSR did not accept the proclamation and regarded it as a unilateral Stevenson's letter act on the part of the United States. Amb. KHRUSHCHEV was also a unilateral document, and it was not the type of document on which the USSR could not comment or which it must accept. If one side demanded that everything contained in the documents must be accepted, then there was no equality in negotiation, and it meant that one side wished to impose its will on the other. As to the second aspect, one could of course argue at length about the offensive or defensive character of weapons, including those weapons which the US called offensive, but it would be difficult to come to agreement on that point, because weapons could be considered as offensive under certain conditions and defensive under other conditions. This point had been made in Mr. Khrushchev's correspondence. For instance, the US regarded the USSR bases as defensive, but the USSR disagreed. The US believed that

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all weapons at these bases were defensive, even though these were the same armaments as those which had been in Cuba. Thus the problem should not be complicated further, and both sides should do their best to implement what was under discussion here, and ^{thereby} make a great contribution to peace. There were no obstacles to agreement, and no objective person could understand why additional questions ^{should} be raised. For its part, the USSR had ^{dis-}mantled the missiles and the missile bases and had transported ^{the equipment} them to ports, where ^{it was} they were being loaded on ships. The USSR had stated that no offensive weapons would be sent to Cuba, and that it would implement a number of other measures. Thus it was difficult to understand why believe that the US was raising these additional questions in the spirit of good will. The USSR was prepared to do everything to resolve the problem, taking of course the US views into account, but the US should not complicate the matter.

Mr. McNamara again referred to his remark the other night that it would take a long time to create aircraft, and pointed out that nobody had disagreed at that time. Thus there was no question of good faith; the matter of aircraft was an old story and there was nothing new here.

Mr. Khrushchev said the ^{had begun} story began on November 2.

Mr. McNamara responded that he had mentioned aircraft on November 1 and no one had objected. Also, in his conversation with Mr. Yuri Zhukov on November 1, the latter had indicated that bombers were included.

Mr. Khrushchev said Mr. Zhukov was a newspaperman and was not responsible for the conduct of negotiations. In any event, it made no difference whether the question had been raised on November 1 or 2.

Adj. Stevenson pointed out that the President's October 27 letter

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referred to "weapons systems" and this definitely included IL-28 aircraft. Mr. Khrushchev's October 23 reply referred to "the weapons which you describe as offensive"; thus, there could not be ^{no} any misunderstanding. The references were to all weapons capable of offensive use. Bombers were definitely offensive weapons, although perhaps not very good offensive weapons.

Mr. McClay noted that in the Security Council and we had showed pictures of IL-28 aircraft, had given their range, and had pointed out they were capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Thus there was no question that this matter had been in the everybody's mind since the very beginning.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that Mr. Amb. Stevenson's and Mr. McClay's last remarks attested to the fact that the US now wished to ^{continue} ~~summarize~~ the present negotiations in such difficulties ^{as could not be unraveled}. There was no reference to bombers in the language of the President's message, but one could of course read into it even such things as artillery, machine ^{guns} and rifles. Mr. Kuznetsov said he was sorry that such expertised people as Amb. Stevenson and Mr. McClay had wanted to convince him that the President's language covered IL-28 aircraft. Such a contention was illogical and contrary to fact.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that since the US seemed to attach great importance to this matter, he wished to make a few comments. He said we must not depart from the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement; otherwise we would get off the track and it would be difficult to reach agreement. The basis for negotiations must be the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. Politics

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exists, the substance of that agreement was as follows: a) ^{the} The US was to give assurances against invasion of Cuba either by the US, or by its allies, or by any state in the Western Hemisphere; Mr. Khrushchev commented that he would like to hear the US views on this point, but the US was trying to evade the subject; and b) As was evident from Mr. Khrushchev's message, the USSR was to remove the missiles which the President regarded as offensive; Mr. Khrushchev said that there was no question that missiles which the US called ^{had been} offensive/~~was the~~ subject of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange, the Security Council debate, and the current talks. He said that this must be emphasized if we ^{wanted to} ~~wanted to~~ get back on the track, and the track was the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. The USSR had stated that no offensive weapons would be sent to ^{this} Cuba, and in undertaking ^{this} obligation it believed that both sides should fulfill their commitments. The dismantling of rockets had started on October 28 and had been completed on November 2. All rockets and servicing equipment were to be shipped out of Cuba on November 7, 8 and 12. If the US ~~would~~ ^{would} advance additional questions, then that would not promote solution of the problem. The USSR also had very many questions to raise, but it refrained from doing so at this time because it believed that both sides should concentrate on the solution of the problem at hand. There were many questions causing great concern to the USSR and to the Soviet people, but ^{these} ~~these~~ questions were not being raised not because the USSR felt weak or afraid, but because it believed that everything should be done ^{the} ~~at the~~ proper time.

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that as far as the President's reference to bombers in his October 27 speech was concerned, he wished to state that there were no bombers in Cuba which could be described as offensive. IL-28 aircraft were fifteen years old and had been eliminated from the armaments of the

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They Soviet armed forces. ^{aircraft} ~~These~~ were not used even as targets for anti-aircraft artillery exercises. They were used only for coastal defense purposes, and even then they required anti-aircraft artillery support. If the US continued to insist on this point, that would indicate that ^{it wished} ~~the US~~ to go back on its obligations, and to delay agreement, and to protract a situation where conflict was possible. Reference in Amb. Stevenson's November 2 letter to aircraft assembly was inaccurate and was, in Soviet view, an in-^{because} version of US intelligence. / It was impossible to see what was not there. This fact was alarming to the USSR, because it indicated that attempts were being made to find an excuse for delaying agreement and postponing the normalization of the situation. Indeed, it indicated an intention to raise tensions. Mr. Kuznetsov expressed the hope that the Soviet position would be understood and reported to the US Government. The Soviet Government was concerned about the situation and considered it necessary to state its views clearly so as to find a solution acceptable to both sides. As to Mr. McNamara's remark that he had mentioned aircraft in his conversation with Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to point out that the first sentence of Amb. Stevenson's letter to Mr. Khrushchev read as follows: "One thing that Mr. McNamara and I neglected to discuss with you last night was the list of items that the United States considers in the category of offensive weapons ... " etc.

Amb. Stevenson recalled Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that we should stick to the agreement and pointed out that this was precisely what the US expected the USSR to do. The agreement said that missiles and other weapons

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weapons systems of offensive capabilities would be removed. We were raising no new questions; in fact, the USSR was raising them. Amb. Stevenson asked whether there would be any question of offensive capabilities if the aircraft involved were not ^{the} IL-28, but a three-thousand-mile bomber.

Mr. Kuznetsov commented that Amb. Stevenson should not ask any questions, but proceed with his remarks.

Amb. Stevenson continued that the USSR claimed the IL-28 was not offensive because it did not go far enough, so his question was ^alegitimate one. As to Mr. Kuznetsov's question from the November 2 letter to Mr. Mikoyan, the point was that he, Stevenson, had said in his conversation with Mikoyan that he would give him our list of weapons but failed to do so. He had raised the question of bombers repeatedly, and from our standpoint they were weapons capable of offensive use. Thus we were in a vicious circle: We were saying that bombers were offensive, while the USSR said they were not because they could not go far enough. The question was what made bombers offensive.

Mr. McKay observed that, as confirmed by Mr. Kuznetsov, ^{that} Mr. Khrushchev had agreed to remove all weapons which the US regarded as offensive. How could the USSR know what we regarded as offensive weapons, unless we told them? It was true, of course, that missiles were the most sinister weapons, but throughout the exchange of correspondence and discussions, it had been contemplated that other weapons would be included as well. If bombers were not to be included what else could be? Perhaps there was something else there. As far as the US was concerned, we did not intend to go down the list and include even pistols in the category of offensive weapons.

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but bombers, and not only missiles, were a threat to the United States and to Latin America.

Mr. Stevenson observed that one could say that even missiles were not offensive unless they had ~~///~~ ^{warheads}, but the US thought that this went without saying.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to stress that the two sides were engaged in serious negotiation. Therefore, the USSR was greatly concerned when the US substituted for serious discussion such questions as whether the US had raised certain points on November 1 or November 2 or at some other date. The USSR believed that both sides must discuss the substance of the matter and find possibilities for agreement. Quotations from letters and the US claim that they spoke of a broad range of weapons considered as offensive by the United States constituted a one-sided approach to the problem. He said he wished to recall that the President's statement as well as some other US documents had said that the US was not opposed to Cuba's possessing defensive armaments. And now, when the US was trying to draw the USSR into a discussion of what was offensive or defensive, he wished to stress that Cuba was a sovereign and independent state and could determine itself what was defensive. In any event, there was no question about the fact that it had ^{was} ~~had~~ missiles which ~~that~~ had been in everybody's mind in the course of the US-USSR exchange. As to bombers, be it bombers with a three-thousand-mile range or any other range, Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to reiterate that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. The US should consider the specifications of the H-50 and approach the problem from

from the standpoint of substance and not of its own desires.

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that he wished to make a few comments on the nature of the present negotiations. The USSR believed that the US wanted the other side to accept everything it demanded. The US seemed to believe that this was a legitimate approach. However, this did not represent negotiations on the basis of equality. The USSR believed that both sides must seek compromise solutions. What the USSR had already done and what it intended to do made it quite clear that the USSR wished a speedy solution of the problem. Unfortunately, the US position seemed to be different. For instance, it was difficult to understand the US position on the quarantine. The quarantine could not facilitate solution of the problem but could only make it more difficult, and it increased tensions. Although the United States had not stated it openly, it did not wish to accept the U Thant proposal under which the USSR was to refrain from sending offensive weapons to Cuba during a period of two to three weeks, and ^{the} US was to lift the quarantine for a similar period of time. Then, it would appear that the US wanted to get what it wanted ~~without~~, without making any concessions or doing what was necessary in order to implement the Kennedy - Khrushchev agreement. It should be noted that there remained the question of ~~guaranteeing~~ guarantees to Cuba and of what should be done in order not to allow recurrence of the conflict. Mr. Mikoyan and he, ^{personally} ~~Kuznetsov~~ had raised this question earlier but the US remained silent. However, both sides must see what they have had to do to implement the agreement. For its part, the US should consider an approach to the problem ~~immediatly~~ which would not cause the negotiations to stumble and lose what had already been

achieved

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achieved in the search for a solution.

Mr. Amb. Stevenson stressed that the US did not speak of irrelevant details, but merely wished to avoid misunderstandings which could affect the negotiations. Mr. Kuznetsov had said we should discuss substance, but bombers were substance.

Mr. McCloy recalled Mr. Kuznetsov's remark about the fallibility of reconnaissance and pointed out that ^{in recent weeks} the US had gained considerable confidence ⁱⁿ its photographs. ^{If} ~~Within~~ our photographs were inaccurate, then there was something strange going on, because we saw more and more bombers coming out of crates. Perhaps our photographs were wrong, but we believed them more than Mr. Kuznetsov had seemed to. As to the IL-28, Mr. Kuznetsov had almost convinced us that these aircraft flew backward; however, it must be borne in mind that they were a formidable weapon in this part of the world. The Latin American countries were even more concerned about these aircraft than we were, and because if ^(with his subversive intentions) Castro wanted to use them, ^{he would} ~~he could~~ ^{would} pose a tremendous threat. In other words, no matter how obsolete that bomber was from the Soviet or US standpoint, it was a formidable weapon as far as Latin American countries were concerned. ~~Anticipating~~ After all, in a world of the blind, a one-eyed man is the king. Mr.

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Mr. McCloy urged Mr. Kuznetsov not to suggest that the US was raising this point in a spirit of ill-will. This was a serious question and we hope that on second thought the USSR would realize that the US did not wish to muddy the waters and would see the objective we wanted to attain.

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There were many points we wanted to discuss, but we were reasonable and in our approach. Mr. McCloy reiterated that our photographs showed increased aircraft assembly operations, but noted that on the other hand they ^{also} showed vigorous compliance with Mr. Khrushchev's commitment to dismantle and remove missiles.

Mr. Khrushchev said that the USSR could not agree with the American point of view with regard to the IL-28. He said he wished to state once more the Soviet point of view, so that ^{the} US could study it again and that an acceptable solution could be found without complicating the matter. Mr. McCloy had raised the problem in a new framework, but the USSR could not agree with his description of Cuba and its government. The USSR knew that the US did not like the Cuban revolutionary government and had taken steps to overthrow it. However, the Cuban revolutionary government had come to power with the support of the Cuban people and reflected the wishes of the Cubans. If we were to approach international problems from the standpoint of whether or not one liked certain governments or regimes, these problems would never be settled. Furthermore, Mr. McCloy seemed to speak on behalf of all Latin American countries and had asserted that these countries were concerned about the situation. The USSR did not recognize the US right to speak for all Latin American countries. It could say, however, that all Latin American peoples would be happy if all the questions around Cuba were resolved and if measures were taken to prevent their recurrence of the crisis.

Mr. Stevenson inquired whether he had understood correctly that Mr. Khrushchev did not include the IL-28 in the category of weapons to be removed.

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Mr. Khrushchev

Mr. Kuznetsov confirmed Ans. Stevenson understanding. He said that these aircraft were not included because they were not offensive armaments.

Ans. Stevenson ^{stressed} noted that this created a serious impasse. The Soviet objection of the removal of nuclear bombers caused a most serious situation. He would have to report quickly to our government in the hope that the USSR would reconsider its position. He said we did not wish to leave any misapprehension that the US Government classed these aircraft in the same way as missiles, and inquired whether perhaps another meeting should be held tomorrow.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that this sounded like an ultimatum.

Ans. Stevenson replied that he had come to clarify the question of the IL-28 aircraft.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he had given a lengthy explanation of the Soviet position on it that point. The USSR did not consider the IL-28 as offensive weapons and the Soviet Government would act accordingly. He suggested that Ans. Stevenson report to his government, and the Soviet Delegation would do the same.

Mr. McNamara ^{was} said that this development ~~induced~~ ^{was} a great surprise to the US Government. He would report immediately in the light of its significance.

Mr. Kuznetsov then turned to the question of the schedule of shipment of rockets and other equipment. He said that the first ship, LAMER, would leave by November 6. On November 7, additional eight ships would

leave

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leave Cuba, but there was no information whether this would complete the removal operation.

Referring to verification of in-bound ships by the IIRC, Mr. Kuznetsov said that the USSR had decided to make the ship ALPHA available for stationing off the territorial waters of Cuba somewhere north of Havana. All some details with respect to signals and identification would have to be worked out, and appropriate information had already been given to the Acting Secretary General of the UN. Mr. Kuznetsov also noted that all Soviet ships would leave from Havana, although they Windward Channel route might be used after November 12.

Mr. McElroy reminded Mr. Kuznetsov that he had told him that he could not commit the US Government with regard to the use of a Soviet ship. The US Government might find it difficult to accept a Soviet ship for the same reasons the USSR objected to a US ship. The easiest solution would be to use a neutral ship, perhaps Swedish.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he was astonished, because the US had not ^{previously} objected to the use of a Soviet ship. ~~previously~~ The possibility of using a Soviet ship had been discussed with Mr. Kibegov and was not a new point.

Ans. Stoyanov said he would report to his government, and inquired whether the USSR would object to a neutral ship.

Mr. Kuznetsov said Mr. McElroy had not objected to the use of a Soviet ship during the conversation yesterday.

Mr. McElroy reiterated that he had told Mr. Kuznetsov that he could not commit the US Government on this point. He then recalled Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that substance should be discussed, and stressed that the question of

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^{inquired}
warheads was real substance. ~~He mentioned~~ how the USSR could satisfy the
^{warhead}
US that they were out, and ~~where/anywhere~~ they were now.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that many questions could be raised if one entered upon the ^{path} ~~fact~~ of discussing details. Of course Mr. McCloy was within his rights in doing so, but it should be noted ^{that what} that the USSR had done clearly indicated that it intended to fulfill its commitment. All the equipment related to what the US called offensive missiles, including warheads -- if warheads had been there at all -- would be removed and returned to the Soviet Union. All these commitments would be fulfilled honestly, and there should be no doubt about it. The USSR had the impression that the US was raising all these questions in order to postpone the final solution of the problem.

Sub. Stevenson pointed out that the system of visual observation could tell us about missiles but not about warheads.

Mr. McCloy stressed that this was not a question of detail. It was the warhead that was the destructive component of the weapon, and it was unfair to suggest that we were raising piecemeal points. Mr. Kuznetsov had said that we could see and count missiles; could we count warheads too?

Mr. Kuznetsov said that this was a new question.

Mr. McCloy reiterated the question of warhead was a very serious one, particularly in view of the fact that ^{perhaps with some modifications} they could be used on bathers.

Mr. Kuznetsov inquired whether the US had any proposal to make.

Mr. McCloy thought that the problem could be resolved if we could ^{while} see and count. Warheads were not very large in size, and we could not go under any every rock and in every cave to look for them, but the see-~~all~~

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and count system ^{might} satisfy us. If the USSR were to tell us how many warheads had been sent in and how many were going out, we could then see whether the figures matched. Mr. McCloy then pointed out ^{that} the problem of warheads was closely related to the Soviet position on the IL-28 aircraft.

Sub. Stevenson observed that perhaps if warheads were attached to the missiles, ~~it~~ both could be seen and counted as Mr. Khrushchev had suggested to Mr. McCloy. The problem with regard to the warheads was very closely related to the problem of the IL-28, and we wished to be satisfied that the USSR had done what we were sure it would do. Thus, this was not an unreasonable question to raise.

Mr. Khrushchev said he disagreed. He had expressed the Soviet view on the question of the IL-28. He would, of course, report the US views on this point, but the fact that the US had raised the question ~~that~~ indicated it wished to complicate the problem.

Mr. McCloy replied that Mr. Khrushchev could not say this. Mr. Khrushchev would surely understand the problem, although he could not deliver his promise with regard to ground inspection in Cuba. This was a very reasonable question and it was not an indication of our insincerity. Indeed, we showed our sincerity by raising it. While he was not sure that technique or verification could be used with regard to warheads, there was no secret about making warheads and perhaps we could count them.

Mr. McCloy observed that after his conversation with Mr. Khrushchev yesterday he talked to the President on the phone. Washington believed that the conversation promised progress and was giving serious consideration to the views expressed. However, we should not shut our eyes to serious

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problems. When we speak of warheads, we speak of any nuclear bombs. We believed there were warheads in Cuba, and in fact we had some evidence to that effect.

Ambassador Stevenson noted that the problem of warheads highlighted the need for ground inspection. Perhaps all warheads could be brought together in one place and ^{the} ~~we~~ could count them. However, we did not know what progress Mr. Mikoyan had made in Havana.

Mr. Khrushchev said he was gratified to hear ^{about} ~~the~~ President's appraisal of the yesterday's conversation. He felt such appraisal was justified because the USSR had undertaken all practical steps in order to resolve this problem. In response to Mr. McCloy's request, he had given ~~to~~ him yesterday some information which almost proved that the Soviet Government went very far in seeking a solution to this problem. As far as warheads were concerned, USSR would remove from Cuba, in accordance with Mr. Khrushchev's statement, everything related to the so-called offensive missiles. He said he could not say anything beyond that.

Mr. McCloy remarked he understood that Mr. Khrushchev would take up the question of warheads with his government.

Ambassador Stevenson observed that as a result of this conversation three questions remained open: removal of the IL-28 aircraft, nationality of the inspection ship, and verification of the removal of warheads, although ~~however~~ Mr. Khrushchev had given assurances that warheads would be removed.

Mr. Khrushchev disagreed, saying there was no open question from the Soviet standpoint. He concluded by appealing to the US to consider the Soviet deeds and respond in kind.